www.buskill.in Disarm BusKill in QubesOS - BusKill
Keyboard shortcuts in QubesOS to arm & disarm (pause) the BusKill laptop kill cord -- so you can go to the bathroom without your laptop self-destruct triggering
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml maltfield @monero.town Disarm Shortcut for BusKill Hardware Dead Man Switch
This article describes how to setup keyboard shortcuts in QubesOS so that you can temporarily disarm (pause) the BusKill laptop kill cord.
This allows the user to, for example, go to the bathroom without causing their computer to shutdown or self-destruct.
This is a guide that builds on part one: A Laptop Kill Cord for QubesOS (1/2). Before reading this, you should already be familiar with how to setup udev rules for BusKill on QubesOS.
- A Laptop Kill Cord for QubesOS (1/2)
- Disarm BusKill in QubesOS (2/2)
ⓘ Note: This post is adapted from its original article on Tom Hockers blog.
What is BusKill?
What if someone literally steals your lapt
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml lovehumanityx @lemmy.ml Computers that "just work" with the current Qubes OS release (unofficial)
forum.qubes-os.org Community-recommended computersR4.1 Note: upgrading heads/coreboot is required for R4.1 install to work. Laptops brand model CPU max. mem in GB (slots)[1] USB ctrl.[2] core boot[3] note Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230 i7-3520M 16 (2) 3 yes certified, pre-installed Lenovo ThinkPad P51 i7-7820HQ 64 (4) 1 no ThinkPad T430 ...
And reddit discussion of this with people giving other laptops that work with Qubes OS https://www.reddit.com/r/Qubes/comments/p6wc73/computers_that_just_work_with_the_current_qubes/
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml lovehumanityx @lemmy.ml Has there ever been a case where a Qubes User has been compromised?
Curious to see if there has ever been such a case...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml fittonia @lemmy.ml Fedora 34 template for Qubes OS available for testing (for both 4.0 and 4.1)
forum.qubes-os.org Fedora 34 template available for testing (for both 4.0 and 4.1)Dear Qubes Testers, The Fedora 34 template is now available for testing (see #6568). As usual, you can find it in the qubes-templates-itl-testing repository for both Qubes 4.0 and 4.1. As always, your feedback will be invaluable in helping us determine when to release the stable version of this tem...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml fittonia @lemmy.ml Invisible Things Lab, thanks to them, is the biggest donor to Qubes OS, here how
forum.qubes-os.org What's Wildland's Relationship With Qubes?Hi all, I’ve spoken with Marek about this. We believe it’s important to clear up any misconceptions regarding members of the Qubes team working on Wildland. We don’t want anyone to get the wrong impression or assume the worst. Some people might assume that we care more about other projects than ab...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml fittonia @lemmy.ml Invisible Things Lab brings the security of Qubes OS to the enterprise with cutting-edge research in virtualization, kernel, and system-level security.
invisiblethingslab.com Invisible Things LabInvisible Things Lab brings the security of Qubes OS to the enterprise with cutting-edge research in virtualization, kernel, and system-level security.
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml fittonia @lemmy.ml 
www.qubes-os.org The Qubes Forum is moving to a new home!Update: The migration has been completed successfully! Since the Qubes Forum first launched over nine months ago, it’s been far more popular than we anticipated! While this has been a pleasant surprise, one consequence is that we’ve outgrown the free hosting for open source projects tha...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml fittonia @lemmy.ml www.qubes-os.org Qubes Canary 027We have published Qubes Canary 027. The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack). View Qubes Canary 027 in the qubes-secpack: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/mas...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml fittonia @lemmy.ml www.qubes-os.org Qubes OS Project now accepting donations in Monero!We are pleased to announce that the Qubes OS Project is now accepting donations in the privacy-oriented cryptocurrency Monero (XMR) at the following address: 46PrVgXBdD4cps3SVkHoCDZvMfFdG5q4ej5DYKpuKpTnjiL7pv6KGv7dPh4DPijCGqTbxLDPqZJkobd9SttMiauoP1CQU4y We have received an increasing nu...
"We are pleased to announce that the Qubes OS Project is now accepting donations in the privacy-oriented cryptocurrency Monero (XMR) at the following address:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/06/11/qubes-os-project-now-accepting-donations-in-monero/
We have received an increasing number of requests for Monero as a donation method over the past few years. We are proud that Qubes is the OS of choice for so many privacy-conscious individuals, and we are pleased to be able to offer a more private donation method for those users to show their support.
As with our Bitcoin donation address, you can verify the authenticity of the Monero donation address via the Qubes Security Pack in the fund directory. We also provide detailed instructions for verifying the digital signatures.
As with all other donations, your Monero donations will directly fund the Qubes OS Project. Since Qubes is free and open-source software, we do not earn any revenue by selling it. Instead, we rely on your financia
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml rarez @lemmy.ml www.qubes-os.org Qubes Canary #24We have published Qubes Canary #24. The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack). View Qubes Canary #24 in the qubes-secpack: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/mas...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml rarez @lemmy.ml www.qubes-os.org Get paid to support Qubes development through automated testing! (three-month contract)The Qubes OS Project is seeking an expert in automated testing. We use OpenQA and Travis to test changes to the Qubes OS source code and automated building from source. We’re looking for someone who can help with improving both the automated tests themselves and the testing infrastructu...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml rarez @lemmy.ml www.qubes-os.org QSB #059: Multiple Xen issues (XSA-337, XSA-340, XSA-343)We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) #059: Multiple Xen issues (XSA-337, XSA-340, XSA-343). The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack). View QSB #059 in the qubes-...
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QubesOS discussion @lemmy.ml rarez @lemmy.ml www.qubes-os.org XSAs 333, 334, 336, 338, 339, 342, and 344 do not affect the security of Qubes OSThe Xen Project has published the following Xen Security Advisories: XSA-333, XSA-334, XSA-336, XSA-338, XSA-339, XSA-342, and XSA-344. These XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary. These XSAs have been added to the XSA Tracker: https://www.qubes-os...