Skip Navigation

Bulletins and News Discussion from July 7th to July 13th, 2025 - Sanctions on Russia: The Sequel

Image is of the Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline, which transports gas from Russia to China. This isn't an oil pipeline (such as the ESPO) but I thought it looked cool. Source here.


Trump has recently proposed a 500% tariff on goods from countries that trade with Russia, including India and China (who buy ~70% of Russia's oil output), as well as a 10% additional tariff on goods from countries that "align themselves with BRICS." Considering that China is the largest trading partner of most of the countries on the planet at this point, and India and Brazil are reasonably strong regional players, I'm not sure what exactly "alignment" means, but it could be pretty bad.

Sanctions and tariffs on Russian products have been difficult to achieve in practice. It's easy to write an order to sanction Russia, but much harder to actually enforce these sorts of things because of, for example, the Russian shadow oil fleet, or countries like Kazakhstan acting as covert middlemen (well, as covert as a very sudden oil export boom can be).

Considering that China was pretty soundly victorious last time around, I'm cautiously optimistic, especially because China and India just outright cutting off their supply of energy and fuel would be catastrophic to them (and if Iran and Israel go to war again any time in the near future, it'll only be more disastrous). Barring China and India kowtowing to Trump and copying Europe vis-a-vis Nordstream 2 (which isn't impossible, I suppose), the question is whether China and India will appear to accede to these commands while secretly continuing trade with Russia through middlemen, or if they will be more defiant in the face of American pressure.


Last week's thread is here.
The Imperialism Reading Group is here.

Please check out the RedAtlas!

The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.

You're viewing a single thread.

912 comments
  • Brazilian demonstrators burn effigy of Donald Trump in anger at his interference in the country. Spontaneous protests occurred around the country on Thursday in response to Trump’s attempts to halt trial of coup plotter Jair Bolsonaro. For the first time Donald Trump has disabled comments on his Instagram account in wake of backlash from furious Brazilians over his interference in the country.

    Lula gave 2 tv interviews today, including a long one on the main evening broadcast, to discuss the Trump imbroglio. Aside from the substance, one thing striking is Lula’s profound offense at the fact that Trump communicated the move out of nowhere via a social media post. Lula just now systematically dismantling the arguments Trump made in his letter yesterday announcing 50% tariffs on Brazilian goods. Lula says he initially thought the letter was fake because of how unprecedented it was.

    Lula responds to Trump’s tariff threats

    “If [Trump] had done that here in Brazil, he would be processed and tried just like Bolsonaro, because he undermined democracy, because he undermined the Constitution.”

    Brazilian President and workers' leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, responded to the letter sent by US President Donald Trump regarding internal affairs of the South American country and threatening to impose 50% tariffs on Brazilian goods. Lula qualified the letter as an "insult" to Brazil, and he explained that Trump "is trying to do this with the whole world."

    • Do you think Trump could help radicalize Brazil? Make it less liberal? Force it into stronger coalitions with China or anti-imperialist, non-Western countries?

      • One thing I'd like to add which is probably a bit depressing for a website so steeped in the hopes of political organization is that there's something more important than radicalizing regular Brazilians. It is mildly inconveniencing Brazilian capitalists.

        Brazil is a neo-feudal economy where each state is dominated by one and up to a handful of dynasties. Often these clans are centuries old. Their 'clients', or supporters, are not so much large groups of poorer brazilians but rather the lesser nobility which bridges the gap with the masses, of which the Bolsonaro family is only one amongst many.

        My wording is very deliberate. These families like the Andradas are often descendants of Viscounts and Ministers of Brazil's monarchical period. Sometimes their influence is even older than that. They all remained aristocrats after the formal end of Slavery, they dabbled into industrial capitalism during the national developmentist period (1930s-1982) and were knocked right back into being landowners first due to the IMF policies imposed on Brazil after the great latin american sovereign debt crisis. The Marinhos for an example are famous for owning the largest media broadcaster in Brazil, Globo. But their real fortunes is, like everyone else's, tied to Agribusiness exports. Every brazilian region, state and microregion mirrors that dynamic - an oligarchy that owns mining and farming ventures, owns the local broadcasters, has infinite amounts of credit and money with which to dominate the higher echelons of politics. They are often mayors, governors and senators. Local assemblies, state assemblies and the lower house of congress are then staffed by their lesser peers, the small time oligarchs like the Bolsonaros - a smaller landowning family that has ties with Rio de Janeiro's criminal scene.

        Which brings us to the tariffs.

        You can argue that the tariff-blackmail was a long time coming (it's the second time its been done to Brazil this year), and the odds are that industry was already planning around this high likelihood. The fact is that the Bolsonaros provided the US government with a smokescreen to attack the profits of Brazil's entire aristocracy. This is something that triggered unexpected political support in Congress. Ie, the Agribusiness Caucus is demanding that Lula respond firmly to Trump. The same Agribusiness Caucus that was behind financing Bolsonaro's coup attempt. The larger context being that this isn't just about the (very much commodity dominated) brazilian exports to the US either. It is about the fact that the US is Brazil's competitor when it comes to agricultural exports to China.

        To put it into perspective our soybean exports to China is superior in value to everything we export to the US put together, with China, Europe and even Argentina being this year's growth markets. Not the USA.

        Brazil is in the afterglow of the Jakarta Method. There will always be that hard core group of 20 to 30 percent of people that considers themselves right wing and, quite literally, places the US above not only Brazil but probably God as well. Then there's the rest of the country. Either way normal people organizing or becoming reflexively more anti american is on the menu, which is quite an achievement because unlike all the spanish speaking countries Brazil does not actually have a history of anti americanism - before, during or after the Cold War. But as far as I can tell what the Bolsonaros did against the extractive elites is their real sin.

        • Very nice write up.

          Can you comment on the Brazilian soybean production and supply chain with respect to foreign vs local bourgeois ownerships?

          I did some homework a while back and the data suggest that apart from the farming, the vast majority of the soybean supply chain in Brazil is under control of foreign multinational corporations:

          From Transparency in Global Agribusiness: Transforming Brazil’s Soybean Supply Chain Based on Companies’ Accountability:

          • The paper you linked is pretty succint and paints the battleground well. Brazilian agribusiness is state policy, but only the land itself and the commercialization of its labor can be said to be nationally owned. Inputs of all kinds comes from a number of different countries, while China is the main client by far. What immediately comes to mind is the situation of machinery and fertilizers.

            The massive 'Others' under fertilizers means a number of middle eastern countries and Russia. Which explains some of the political pains that happened in Brazil when Bolsonaro was in power and Russia invaded Ukraine. There was this knee-jerk reaction to side with the United States (even though it was Biden who was president). But at the time Russia's trade hadn't yet been re-routed through China, so Brazil's political room for maneuver was limited.

            Now with Machinery the US remains an important partner. But is it even an indispensible one for that matter? With seeds and fertilizers you can argue that medium term investments could enable onshoring in both sectors. But with farm equipment you probably wouldn't even need to do that since, I assume, China can just become the main supplier instead. This is where I think much of the political agonizing comes from. To sustain its agribusiness Brazil trades with every region of the world at once and there's very little keeping any one partner, most crucially China, from becoming a one stop shop for all the needs of the Brazilian elite.

            It's good that you posted this because I don't want to give anyone the impression that Brazil has something akin to a 'national bourgeoisie'. We haven't had that since as late as the 1990s. Brazilian capitalists are happy to be junior partners of international production chains and secondary players in the financial markets. They are an aristocracy profitting from the periphery of global capitalism, and these two paragraphs from the paper you linked summarize this perfectly:

            Specifically, this study reveals that multinational corporations established along Brazil’s soybean supply chain controls 91.3% of the seed, 99.8% of the machinery, 80.8% of the fertiliser, 94.2% of the agrochemicals, and 83.9% of the trading sectors. German companies control the seeds sector and have an important market share in the agrochemical business. Companies in the US control the machinery sector and have important shares in the agrochemical and trading sectors. Chinese groups have a relevant market share in the agrochemical and trading sectors.

            As Brazilian groups control 93.4% of the farming sector, but only 7.1% of the agro-industrial sector, they should explore trade-offs between reducing investments in farming expansion into new agricultural frontiers and increasing their market share in agro-industrial segments. This study reveals two possible trade-offs between reduced farming expansion and increasing the industrial market share. The opportunity costs of hindered farming expansion can be offset either by an 11% domestic market share growth in the trading segment or by a 5.2% domestic market share growth in the whole supply chain. Domestic investments in the agro-industrial segments should be promoted as an alternative to investments in farming expansion into new agricultural frontiers.

            Brazilian business culture is whatever was left after the country survived IMF sponsored austerity. And that was a best case scenario of sorts. When the sovereign debt crisis hit in 1982, industrial policy was largely dismantled for most things except agricultural expansion and plane manufacturing. This was part of the larger currency devaluation and export oriented strategy. It worked well enough to increase volumes, wreacked havoc on common people's purchasing power, but eventually paid some dividends in the form of massive commodity exports. Now nobody in charge wants to endanger those breadcrumbs. In part because they don't feel like the country can afford to compete in manufacturing or technology. In part because nothing is stopping them from behaving like international capitalists and becoming shareholders of the companies that supply them. In part agricultural industry is just not their business. Clearing more land for exploitation is.

      • If the tendencies are similar to what you see in Colombia, it would only cause people to become more anti-american. But that on its own doesn't make people less liberal or, god forbid, commies.

        On the other hand, the anti-China rhetoric has ramped down, and, from at least what I can see, China is slowly being less seen as a country that manufactures cheap copies and is ever so slightly more respected.

        It's a long process though.

        Now, for people going full anti-imperialist? I think it will take the US directly attacking a country in the region. Possibly Panama or Mexico. But the loss in civil society support of gringo hegemony is definitely noticeable today.

      • Do you think Trump could help radicalize Brazil? Make it less liberal?

        No, I believe not until Lula da Silva leaves power as president, he is the leader of one of the more moderate left-wing factions within the Workers' Party (the party is generally more left-wing than Lula, while Lula is a SocDem, the party supports Democratic Socialism). And Lula is still the most influential and popular left-wing leader in Brazil. So unless Trump does something really stupid, like attempt a military coup or mess with Brazil too much, I don't see Lula becoming totally left-wing. I believe there is potential for a Workers Party candidate to be a democratic socialist and be elected and supported by Lula in the future, if the left becomes popular/right becomes unpopular enough for that to happen.

        Force it into stronger coalitions with China or anti-imperialist, non-Western countries?

        This I can see happening, as Lula generally has a good foreign policy that hasn't changed much since the early 1990s (they used to be pro-Soviet, but quickly changed to pro-China, but also maintained their own independence in trying to create their own Latin American political bloc, which led to the creation of the São Paulo Forum). Lula also has strong ties with the Middle East, Africa and Asia. I'm sure that Brazil to this day helps train the armies of Namibia and Angola.

        There was some talk of resurrecting Unasur (South America's version of the European Union), but it didn't go anywhere. I think this is because Brazil and most of Latin America want Celac to be more than their version of the OAS, I think they want it to be the Latin American version of the European Union/African Union in the future. Another thing that many people don't talk about is how much Brazil influences Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia and even Suriname, Guyana and Venezuela. It's quite clear that Lula sent part of his campaign staff to help elect Yamandú Orsi (Mojica's presidential candidate) in Uruguay, and, iirc, he also sent the same staff to help Maduro during the election campaign, to Efraín Alegre (Liberal Party - Pro-China Social Democrat) in Paraguay and to Sergio Massa (Left Peronist - Social Democrat) in Argentina.

        Make it less liberal?

        In some Latin American countries, the word liberal also means neoliberal/socially conservative. Generally, party names usually means nothing or make little sense, because politics has changed so much over time that the original party name usually lose its meaning. Example: The Liberal Party of Paraguay is a left-wing social democratic party that supports China, and the Liberal Party of Brazil is a far-right Bolsonaro party that is pro-US.

      • That's kinda what he's doing to every country on the planet, to varying degrees, with his tariffs

912 comments