Quotes from western politicians and diplomats regarding the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact

Hey comrades, I stumbled upon a YouTube comment providing a rich list of primary sources quoted talking about the nature of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as a necessity of the USSR to buy time against Nazism and to prevent a one-on-one war against Germany. That said, I've been trying to check a few of the sources and, given the paraphrasing nature and possible translations in the middle, I haven't confirmed it yet. Can anyone here maybe help me verify at least a few of them so I see if I can trust them?

“ It is clear that Stalin had two courses open to him. He could seek a general coalition against Hitler, or he could come to an understanding with Hitler at the expense of the Western democracies. Stalin’s policy was guided by a profound conviction of the ultimate hostility of Nazi Germany, as well as by the hope that if the capitalist Powers became locked in mortal conflict, the Soviet Union might remain aloof, gaining strength while they tore one another to pieces. Certainly the principle of self-preservation lay at the heart of Moscow’s calculations ” Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Chapter 20, The Soviet Enigma pub 1948.

“ In those days the Soviet Government had grave reason to fear that they would be left one-on-one to face the Nazi fury. Stalin took measures which no free democracy could regard otherwise than with distaste. Yet I never doubted myself that his cardinal aim had been to hold the German armies off from Russia for as long as might be ” (Paraphrased from Churchill’s December 1944 remarks in the House of Commons.)

“ It would be unwise to assume Stalin approves of Hitler’s aggression. Probably the Soviet Government has merely sought a delaying tactic, not wanting to be the next victim. They will have a rude awakening, but they think, at least for now, they can keep the wolf from the door ” Franklin D. Roosevelt (President of the United States, 1933–1945), from Harold L. Ickes’s diary entries, early September 1939. Ickes’s diaries are published as The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes.

“ One must suppose that the Soviet Government, seeing no immediate prospect of real support from outside, decided to make its own arrangements for self‑defence, however unpalatable such an agreement might appear. We in this House cannot be astonished that a government acting solely on grounds of power politics should take that course ” Neville Chamberlain House of Commons Statement, August 24, 1939 (one day after pact's signing)

“ We could not doubt that the Soviet Government, disillusioned by the hesitant negotiations with Britain and France, feared a lone struggle against Hitler’s mighty war machine. It seemed they had concluded, in the interests of survival, that an accord with Germany would at least postpone their day of reckoning ” Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State) The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Published 1948)

“ *It must be said that the Soviet Government, having little confidence in swift military aid from the Western Powers, chose to protect its borders, however odious such a pact might seem. One perceives in their choice the determination to secure time—time they evidently believed we were not prepared to give them.” Édouard Daladier (French Prime Minister), Address to the French Chamber of Deputies, Late August 1939

“ We endeavored to negotiate some arrangement with Moscow, but we were late, we were hesitant, and Stalin, certain that Poland was doomed, concluded that Soviet Russia would be left to face Hitler alone. In that stark prospect, he accepted a pact that he must have found abhorrent, aiming only to defer or avert the coming blow ” Paul Reynaud (Prime Minister of France, March–June 1940), In the Thick of the Fight 1930–1945 (original French edition published 1951).

“ Stalin can see that if we fail to stop Hitler, Russia would next be in the line of fire. He (Stalin) appears convinced that we are neither prepared nor resolved to offer meaningful succour, thus leaving him alone should Herr Hitler turn east. The Soviet pact may be a shameful arrangement, but it is one they believe may defer catastrophe for them ” Lord Halifax (Edward Wood, Viscount Halifax), British Foreign Secretary (1938–1940) – Diary Entries, August 1939

“ It seemed to me that the Soviet leaders believed conflict with Nazi Germany was inescapable. But, lacking clear assurances of military partnership from England and France, they resolved that a ‘breathing spell’ was urgently needed. In that sense, the pact with Germany was a temporary expedient to keep the wolf from the door ” Joseph E. Davies (U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1937–1938), Mission to Moscow (1941)

“ British officials, for all their outrage, concede that Stalin, with no firm pledge of Allied assistance, and regarding Poland as a foregone victim, decided that if the Red Army must eventually face Hitler, it should not be without first gaining some strategic space—and time ” Joseph P. Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to the UK, 1938–1940), Private Correspondence, September 1939

" It is the consensus here that the Soviet Government could not be sure of any practical Franco-British aid. Hence they opted, for the moment, to appease or placate Berlin, hoping to defer a direct confrontation. Though morally repugnant, the arrangement likely served Moscow’s immediate interest of self-preservation " Sumner Welles (U.S. Under Secretary of State, 1937–1943), Memo to President Roosevelt, September 1939

“ Stalin, suspecting that we might fail the test of true collaboration, appears to have resolved to secure his flank against a sudden German blow. He has made a bargain with the Devil, which he cannot trust; yet one understands that he does so to buy a measure of time ” Anthony Eden (British Foreign Secretary, 1940–1945, 1951–1955), Private Diary / Retrospective Commentary (Late 1939 – Early 1940)

“ The Russians have struck their deal with Germany. It appears they concluded the West could not or would not meet them faithfully should events come to blows. Distasteful as it must be, Stalin evidently prefers a German accord to being left in solitary defiance ” Sir Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1938–1946), Diary Entry, August 23–24, 1939

“ Stalin’s pact with Hitler is shocking, but I gather that the Soviets felt they had no friend to rely on in the West. In that vacuum, they seek to stave off the day when Nazi might will be turned upon them. A cruel logic, but one they appear resolved to accept in the name of survival ” Mackenzie King (Prime Minister of Canada, 1921–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1948), Diary Entry, Early September 1939.

“ I well recall that the Soviet leadership never doubted an eventual clash with Germany, but also deeply questioned the reliability of the Western powers. They must believe a pact with Hitler affords precious months—or even weeks—to prepare for what they regard as inevitable ” William Christian Bullitt (U.S. Ambassador to France, 1936–1940; previously Ambassador to the USSR, 1933–1936). From Bullitt’s communications to the U.S. State Department, late August – early September 1939.)

“ We must reckon with Moscow’s view that Hitler’s wrath, if unleashed, will strike them next, and that the feebleness of Anglo-French support to date leaves them little option. Their pact is an odious expedient intended to secure some respite, if only temporary, from the German menace ” Alexis Léger (Saint-John Perse), Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, Internal Memoranda, August 1939

“ The Russians have come to terms with the very power they profess to abhor. It is impossible not to see in their action a cynical wish to keep the wolves at bay, given their doubt—well founded, I fear—that we [Britain and France] should or could rescue them in time ” Harold Nicolson (British MP, Diplomat, and Diarist), The Harold Nicolson Diaries, covering August–September 1939.

" Even among the Soviet hierarchy, there is no pretense that the 1939 agreement with Hitler was anything but a desperate expedient. They fully expected that, in the absence of firm Anglo-French support, Germany would attack them sooner or later; thus they took the only course they believed might yield a breathing space " Stafford Cripps (British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1940–1942), Cripps’s private correspondence, 1941.

“ We can be certain Stalin detests the Reich’s ideology, but he found no better shield than a pact to delay Hitler’s thrust eastward. The Russians, having little faith in Allied intervention, set survival above all else. This is the measure of their desperation ” Jan Smuts (Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, 1939–1948), Smuts’s wartime correspondence, c. September 1939. From the Soviet side between the period of the pact until the invasion in 1941.

“ The Soviet Government, in concluding the Non-Aggression Treaty with Germany, first and foremost secured peace for our country for the foreseeable future. We have moved our defensive lines far to the west. …If the war in the West continues for a long time, we stand to remain apart from it and gain those extra months—or perhaps a year or more—to strengthen our defenses. The old frontier, which was indefensible, has been replaced by a new one, affording us far greater security in the event that war is forced upon us later ” October 31, 1939 (Molotov and Stalin to the Supreme Soviet), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1939–1941: Documents and Materials (a Soviet-era collection).

“ We must not provoke Germany, for our present arrangement remains essential to keeping them from immediate aggression. This interval allows further fortification of the new Western borders ” Internal/Confidential Statements from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Late 1940 – Early 1941).